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Abstract
Some ISPs are trying to become part of the online advertising market. Such ISPs
either: (i) cooperate with online advertising entities (e.g., ad networks) by providing
users’ private information to achieve better ad targeting in exchange for a share of
the revenue, or (ii) modify the ad traffic on-the-fly such that they divert part of the
online advertising revenue for themselves. This is a very important issue because online
advertising is at the core of today’s business model and it fuels many “free” applications
and services. We study this behavior using game theory to model the interactions between
ISPs and ad networks, and we analyze the effects on the Web caused by ISPs taking
part in online advertising. Our results show that if the users’ private information can
improve ad targeting significantly and if ad networks do not have to pay a high share
of revenue to the ISPs, ad networks and ISPs will cooperate to jointly provide targeted
online ads. Otherwise, ISPs will divert part of the online ad revenue for themselves. In
that case, if the diverted revenue is small, ad networks will not react. However, if their
revenue loss is significant, the ad networks will invest into improving the security of the
Web and protecting their ad revenue.
1 Introduction
The traditional role of ISPs is to provide Internet access to end users. ISPs are supposed to
provide this service by only faithfully forwarding end users’ communication, in compliance with
the Network Neutrality Policy [1]. Recently, several cases of ISPs meddling with users’ traffic
and violating the Network Neutrality policy have been reported [2] [3] [4]. Reis et al. [5] show
that more than 1% of Internet traffic is modified on-the-fly between web servers and end users.
The majority of the modifications are performed on the ad traffic (e.g., ad injection, ad blocking)
by ISPs.
Due to their topological position between end users and the Internet, ISPs can observe all the
traffic of their end users. Based on the observed traffic, ISPs can extract users’ private information,
their preferences and interests, and can profile their online behavior. In the EU, to comply with
data retention legislations [6] [7], ISPs have to obtain and keep records of their users’ activities for
a period between six months and two years, and upon request provide them to law enforcement
agencies. This directive has imposed a significant burden on ISPs as it increases their storage
costs and it requires investing into new technologies for packet inspection (e.g., Deep Packet
Inspection [8]). There is no clear answer on how ISPs will obtain a return on that investment.
One possibility for ISPs to generate additional revenue is to take part in the online advertising
business. Online advertising is the main business model on the Web today and it generates huge
revenues (e.g., $23.4 billion in the US in 2008 [9]). However, ISPs are not part of the traditional
online advertising systems. The online advertising revenue model includes ad networks (e.g., the
Google ad network), advertisers and web publishers. In this revenue model, ISPs are bypassed
because the only service they provide is to forward the traffic to and from end users. Hence, ISPs
might be tempted by the high online advertising revenues and might try to become participants in
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have high commercial value (e.g., due to its unavailability to other online entities). According to
observed cases in practice, the behavior of ISPs can be either cooperative or non-cooperative.
A cooperative ISP collects and provides information about users’ online behavior with the
goal of improving ad targeting. This rich data about users can help better matching ads to
users’ interests, resulting in higher click-through rates on ads and consequently increasing the
ad revenue [10]. Cooperative ISPs generate revenue by charging ad networks for user profiles.
There are several examples in practice of ISPs that shared their users’ data with ad companies
(e.g., Phorm [11]), despite many concerns about the users’ privacy [12].
A non-cooperative ISP diverts part of online advertising revenues for its own benefit by
performing some of the attacks described in [4] [13]. For example, it injects ads into the content
of web pages on-the-fly [5] or replaces legitimate ads with its own [4].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth quantitative analysis of ISPs becoming
strategic in the online advertising business. We study the effect of strategic ISPs on the Web using
game theory as a tool to analyze mutually dependent actions of ISPs and the current participating
entities in online advertising systems (e.g., ad networks). Our analysis shows that the outcome of
the game between ISPs and ad networks mostly depends on: (i) the value of the users’ private
information and (ii) the share of the revenue that ad networks offer to ISPs. If the collected users’
private information improves ad targeting significantly and ad networks do not have to pay a high
price for it to the ISPs, the latter tend to be cooperative and they improve the quality of ad targeting
jointly with ad networks. Otherwise, ISPs tend to be non-cooperative. Non-cooperative ISPs can
divert a very small fraction of clicks from all the websites without causing any reaction from
ad networks. However, if ISPs become greedy and divert a high fraction of clicks, ad networks
will secure the high value websites first (by paying for SSL certificates and thus enabling the
use of HTTPS), i.e., the websites that generate high volumes of clicks on their web pages. This
means that the significance of the threat creates incentives for ad networks to protect their ad
revenues, which could result in improved web security. Improved web security would not only
benefit ad networks, but websites and users as well, because the security of all the online content,
not only ads, would be improved. The results also show that ISPs will probably never try to divert
a very high fraction of clicks from very popular websites, as that would cause a higher loss for
ad networks, which would then secure the websites and prevent ISPs from obtaining any revenue
from those websites.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief presentation of the state of the art in
Section 2, we present the system model in Section 3 and the various threats and countermeasures
in Section 4. We present a game-theoretic model with two players, the ISP and the ad network
and identify equilibrium outcomes of that game in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide further
analytical refinements of our model and a numerical example to study the practical impact of the
obtained results in Section 7. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 Related Work
There are two main categories of literature that are relevant to our work: research on fraud in
online advertising and analyses of security investments on the Internet.
Research on online advertising fraud is mostly focused on click fraud [14] [15] [16]. Many
problems that stem from online advertising and security gaps, especially the consequences for
the end users, are addressed in [17]. The economics of click fraud are briefly addressed in [16].
An economic analysis [18], based on a game-theoretic model of the online advertising market,
shows that ad networks that deploy effective algorithms for click fraud detection gain a significant
competitive advantage. If it is the case that some ad networks do not fight click fraud, mechanisms
are proposed in [19] to protect online advertisers from paying for fraudulent clicks. In comparison,
our model does not address click fraud and introduces a new strategic player - the ISP - in addition
to the traditional entities in online advertising (i.e., ad networks, advertisers and publishers). Our
results show that this player can yield significant implications for the security of the Internet.
3Related to the second issue - finding the right incentives to increase the security of the Inter-
net - there are several contributions in the literature. Part of the research focuses on how risk
management and cyberinsurance could be used as a tool for security management [20] [21] [22].
The game-theoretic approach of [23] on strategic security investment models how users choose
between investments in security (e.g., firewalls) or insurance (e.g., backup) mechanisms. The
positive effect of cyberinsurance on the investment of agents in self-protection is analyzed using
a game-theoretic model in [24]. The main conclusion of this work is that cyberinsurance is not a
good incentive for self-protection without regulation. Another line of work proposes a centralized
certification mechanism to encourage ISPs to secure their traffic and analyzes the resulting scheme
using game theory [25]. In contrast to these works, our analysis shows that Internet security can
be increased, under given conditions, without any central oversight and thanks to self-interested
decisions by only a few key players (namely, the ad networks).
3 System Model
We consider a system consisting of the online advertising system and an ISP, as depicted in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The system consists of an online advertising system and an ISP.
3.1 Online Advertising Systems
To have their ads appear with the appropriate web content, Advertisers (AV) subscribe with an
ad network whose role is to automatically embed ads into web pages. Ad networks have contracts
with Websites (WS) that want to host advertisements. When a User (U) visits such a website
(Figure 1, step 1), while downloading the content of the web page (step 2), the user’s browser
will be directed to communicate with one of the Ad Servers (AS) belonging to the ad network
(step 3). The ad server chooses and serves (step 4) the most appropriate ads to the user, such
that users’ interests are matched and the potential revenue is maximized. Throughout the rest
of the paper, we use the terms “ad network” and “ad server” (that belongs to the ad network)
interchangeably. We also use the terms “user” and “user’s browser” interchangeably.
A user-generated click on an advertisement directs the user’s browser to the advertised website
and is called click-through. The event of a click-through being followed by a predefined users’
action on the advertiser’s website (e.g., online purchase or registration for a newsletter) is called
click conversion. According to the terms of a contract, an advertiser pays a certain amount of
money to the AS whenever a click-through or a click conversion on an advertisement occurs. The
AS gives a fraction of the ad revenue to the WS that hosted the ad on which a click-through or
a click conversion occurred. Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the term “clicks” to refer
to the user-generated clicks on ads that create ad revenue for the AS and the WS.
The AS values an associated website based on the volume of clicks and ad traffic generated
by the website’s visitors clicking on hosted ads. Popular websites that attract a great number of
visitors generate more clicks on ads, thus also create a high ad revenue for the associated AS and
themselves.
3.2 Internet Service Providers
Traditionally, an ISP provides Internet access to end users and is topologically placed between
users and the Internet. We say that the system operates in the nominal mode when the ISP only
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model the ISP can also either take advantage of the users’ private information and operate alone as
an ad network offering higher quality clicks to the set of its advertisers (non-cooperative behavior)
or cooperate with ad servers by sharing users’ private information to jointly improve ad targeting
(cooperative behavior).
4 Threats and Countermeasures
Given that ISPs are in the position to observe all the traffic of its subscribers and that recently
they had to invest in technologies that enable profiling of their subscribers’ online behavior, ISPs
can collect a high volume of users’ private data. Such a rich data would be of immense value
for ad networks as it can be used to improve the quality of matching ads to users’ interests [10].
Consequently, ad networks could generate even higher ad revenues. Ad networks are already
deploying mechanisms (e.g., third-party cookies) themselves to track users’ interests. However,
the collected information cannot be as rich as the ISPs are able to obtain, because ISPs have
access to all the users’ traffic (unless it is encrypted). Thus, ad networks might be willing to
subsidize ISPs to profile users’ online behavior in exchange for a share of ad revenue. When the
ISP and the AS are cooperative the system operates in the cooperative mode.
Some ISPs might gain more revenue when being non-cooperative. A non-cooperative ISP plays
a role similar to the role of ad networks: it uses the obtained information about users’ interests
and performs advertising services for a set of its own advertisers. As the ISP is the last hop in
forwarding the traffic towards its subscribers, it can free-ride on the existing traffic to deliver ads of
its choice to the end users. The ISP can simply perform modifications of the content of webpages
on-the-fly between servers and users with the goal of modifying the original ads or injecting new
ads. Another technique is for the ISP to replace entire web pages by modifying users’ DNS traffic
on-the-fly and redirecting users to servers of the ISP’s choice.1 Thus, the affected users would see
altered ads, which are different from the original ads embedded into the webpages by a legitimate
AS associated to the browsed website. When users click on the altered ads, the clicks generate
revenue for the ISP instead of the AS and we say that the ISP has diverted the clicks from the
AS. Consequently, the non-cooperative ISP diverts a part of the ad revenue from the AS. When
the ISP is non-cooperative and diverts clicks (i.e., ad revenue) from the AS the system operates
in the non-cooperative mode.
Depending on the AS’s loss of ad revenue caused by the ISP diverting clicks, the AS might de-
cide to deploy a countermeasure and prevent exploits by the non-cooperative ISP. A straightforward
solution to prevent on-the-fly modifications is to deploy HTTPS instead of HTTP to deliver web
content and ads. HTTPS provides data integrity and in case encryption is used would also reduce
the amount of information ISPs can collect about users. Given the system architecture (Figure 1),
data integrity is necessary in both communication channels2: (i) between users and websites and (ii)
between users and ad servers. So far, HTTPS with valid authentication certificates is used mostly
by a small fraction of websites (e.g., e-commerce). The major part of costs of implementing
HTTPS at a web server is the cost of obtaining a valid X.509 authentication certificate3. Usually,
websites’ owners are not willing to bear this cost. Therefore, if the AS wants associated websites
to deploy HTTPS, it has to cover the costs itself. Deploying HTTPS at ad servers is easy as they
typically belong to major companies that already have valid authentication certificates.
Usually, users ignore security warnings related to certificate verification failures because a high
number of websites use self-signed certificates. However, if websites use valid certificates, browsers
can differentiate between: (i) the case of a website having a self-signed certificate and (ii) the
case when an adversary tampers with a valid certificate or the content of a website. Consequently,
browsers can deploy more sophisticated policies in handling associated security risks in these two
1. However, in this case the websites might detect the decrease in the number of visits and become suspicious.
2. Only data integrity property of HTTPS is necessary, encryption is optional.
3. Data integrity can be provided with Message Authentication Codes which are cheap in terms of computation and
communication overhead. Thus, the per transaction cost of serving content over HTTPS instead of HTTP is negligible
compared to the ad revenue.
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content that has been altered by the adversary.
Each website maximizes its revenue by choosing the ad network whose ads it will host. A
WS can be associated with the AS or with the ISP. This association is known, as the WS has a
contract with the associated ad network. If the WS has willingly decided to associate with the
ISP then the WS’s ad revenue is not affected by the deviating behavior of the ISP. The concerned
websites are the ones that have chosen to host the ads of the AS, but due to the actions of the
non-cooperative ISP, the WS’s web pages are displayed with ads of the ISP. Consequently, the
WS loses the ad revenue.
When the WS that is originally associated with the AS is affected by the non-cooperative
behavior of the ISP, it can only decide whether to accept to deploy HTTPS or not. As explained,
the major cost of deploying HTTPS instead of HTTP at the WS is the cost of a certificate.
If this cost is paid by the AS, then the remaining costs (e.g., per transaction computational
and communication overhead of HTTPS compared to HTTP) are negligible compared to the ad
revenue. Thus, in the presence of the non-cooperative ISP, if the AS is willing to bear the costs,
the WS’s revenue is maximized when it accepts to deploy HTTPS together with the AS. Since
the AS bears the costs, we say that the AS secures the WS.
5 Game-Theoretic Model
We propose a game-theoretic model of the relationship between an ISP and an ad network. The
strategic decision facing an ISP is to be cooperative or not with the ad network. In the case of a
cooperative ISP, an ad network can offer a share of its revenue in exchange for the users’ private
information based on which it improves ad targeting. In the case of a non-cooperative ISP, an ad
network can deploy security mechanisms to prevent the ISP from diverting the revenue. We study
within this model the possible outcomes of this tension between the ISPs and ad networks.
5.1 Actions
We denote the two entities, an ISP and an Ad Server, as players ISP and AS, respectively.
We model the possible behavior of ISP with the following three actions:
• Divert (D): ISP diverts from AS a fraction m of the clicks generated at a website WS
associated with the AS. In practice, this means that ISP modifies the traffic on-the-fly. ISP
diverts the revenue from AS because it charges for the clicks that were supposed to be
associated to the original AS with which the WS had an agreement. This action models the
non-cooperative behavior of ISP .
• Cooperate (C): ISP shares with AS the collected private information about users in order
to help AS improve the quality of ad targeting. In return, it receives from AS a share of the
generated revenue. This action models the cooperative behavior of ISP .
• Abstain (A): ISP takes no action. This models the initial behavior of ISP when it operates
in the nominal mode.
The player AS can choose between the following three actions:
• Abstain (A): AS does not react to the changed behavior of ISP . This models the initial
behavior of AS operating as in the nominal mode.
• Cooperate (C): AS cooperates with ISP by providing a share of its revenue in exchange
for the users’ private information.
• Secure (S): AS secures a given website to prevent the ISP from diverting clicks. The one-
time cost (Css) of securing the website depends on the secure solution that is implemented.
Our model applies, in general, to all solutions in which the AS pays a per website one-time
cost (CSS) to secure ad serving. In the case of HTTPS, AS can buy a digital certificate from
a Certification Authority (e.g., VeriSign) thus enabling the WS to communicate with users
over the HTTPS protocol. HTTPS provides integrity of the content, hence preventing ISP
from meddling with users’ traffic.
65.2 The Game
We model the problem as a dynamic, finite multi-stage game with perfect and complete in-
formation between AS and ISP . We assume that AS can detect on-the-fly modifications of the
ad traffic using mechanisms such as web tripwires [5] and ISP can observe if HTTPS has been
deployed at a given WS or not, hence it is a game with perfect information. The game consists of
n stage games, where each stage game is an extensive-form game in which ISP plays first and
AS plays second. This models the behavior observed in practice, where ISPs act first by taking
part in the online advertising business and then the AS can react. We model the game as a finite
game because business relationships usually have a finite duration. The length of the business
relationship, known to the players, determines the value of n. If the website is not secured, in
each stage game ISP chooses among the actions {D,C,A} and then AS chooses among the
actions {A,C,S}, as illustrated in Figure 2(a). If AS secures the website at some stage of the
multi-stage game, ISP cannot divert clicks until the end of the game and AS cannot secure the
website again. Thus, in all of the following stages, if the website is secured the single stage game
is as illustrated in Figure 2(b).
A SA SA S C
ISP
ASAS AS
(0,a-Css) (0,a-Css)(0,a) (0,a) (c1,c2)(-ε,a-Css)(mb-ε,(1-m)a)
D CA
AA S C
ISP
AS AS
(0,a-Css)(0,a) (0,a) (c1,c2)
CA
(a) Single stage game if a website is not secured
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ASAS AS
(0,a-Css) (0,a-Css)(0,a) (0,a) (c1,c2)(-ε,a-Css)(mb-ε,(1-m)a)
D CA
AA S C
ISP
AS AS
(0,a-Css)(0,a) (0,a) (c1,c2)
CA
(b) Single stage game if a website is secured
Figure 2. Extensive-form single stage games. ISP always plays first.
Note that in the model, we consider clicks on ads generated by ISP ’s subscribers at a single
website. The results are extended to the case of multiple websites in Section 7. The WS is
not modeled as a player in the game because its revenue is maximized when the AS’s revenue
is maximized. As explained in Section 4, the WS always complies with a decision (to deploy
HTTPS or not) that is made by the associated AS. The symbols used in the model are given in
Table 1.
Table 1
TABLE OF SYMBOLS FOR THE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL.
Symbol Definition
m Fraction of clicks ISP diverts
ε Cost of diverting clicks
uAS Ad Server’s total payoff
uISP ISP ’s total payoff
a Ad Server’s total payoff in the nominal model
b ISP ’s per fraction revenue when diverting clicks
c1 ISP ’s total payoff in the cooperation model
c2 Ad Server’s total payoff in the cooperation model
Css One-time cost of securing a website
n Number of stages of the multi-stage game
k1 Stage at which AS secures the website
k2 Stage at which ISP starts diverting clicks
5.3 Analytical Analysis and Results
In this section, we first explain the single stage games presented in Figure 2 and then we present
the outcome of the multi-stage game.
In a stage game, when ISP plays A and it is not part of the online advertising system, AS
earns the nominal revenue a and ISP earns nothing. This corresponds to the case when both
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only faithfully forwards the traffic). Thus, the payoffs of the ISP (uISP ) and the AS (uAS) are
(uISP , uAS)=(0, a).
Cooperation only emerges if both players are willing to cooperate, i.e., if they both play C.
Therefore, AS can choose action C only if ISP has played C. Let the corresponding payoffs in
case of cooperation be (uISP , uAS)=(c1, c2).
If ISP plays D followed by AS playing A, a fraction m of the clicks is successfully diverted,
which brings revenue mb to ISP . ISP has to pay a small cost (ε) in every stage to divert clicks
due to resources invested in mounting and performing attacks (e.g., parsing the code of a web
page, identifying ads and replacing or adding ads).4 Therefore, ISP ’s payoff is mb − ε. When
the diversion of a fraction m of clicks is successful, AS loses a part of its revenue proportional to
the fraction of clicks being diverted, ma. Thus, the payoffs when ISP successfully diverts clicks
from AS are (uISP , uAS)=(mb− ε, (1−m)a).
AS can decide to play S to prevent the loss of its revenue. AS has to pay a one-time cost Css
which makes its payoff a−Css in the stage when it secures the WS. After securing the website,
AS does not have to pay any other costs and it secures its nominal revenue a in all future stages.
Depending on whether ISP has tried to divert clicks or not in the stage game when AS implements
security, it either has a cost ε or not, which corresponds to payoffs (uISP , uAS)=(−ε, a − Css)
and (uISP , uAS)=(0, a− Css), respectively.
To solve the finite multi-stage game with perfect information, we apply backward induction to
determine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game [26]. The resulting outcome
depends on the values of several parameters of the model. We perform an exhaustive analysis for
all the possible values of the model parameters. There are five cases:
Case 1 : ma ≥ Css and c2 > a (1)
Case 2 : ma ≥ Css and c2 ≤ a (2)
Case 3 : ma < Css and c2 ≤ a (3)
Case 4 : ma < Css and c2 > a and c1 ≥ mb− ε (4)
Case 5 : ma < Css and c2 > a and c1 < mb− ε (5)
In practice, the values of the parameters can be estimated by each of the players and they
determine to which of the five cases of the model the system corresponds to.
Next, we present the results for each of the cases. We focus on the outcomes of the SPNE and
we present the full SPNE strategy sets in Appendix A. For proofs, also see Appendix A.
Result 1: In Case 1, there is a unique SPNE where the outcome is (Cooperate,Cooperate) in
every stage game and the corresponding total payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = nc1
uAS = nc2 (6)
In Case 1, if ISP diverts a large fraction (m ≥ Cssa ) of clicks, the best response of AS is to
implement security because the cost of deploying a secure protocol (Css) is smaller than the loss
of revenue due to the diversion of clicks (ma ≥ Css). If AS implements security, ISP does
not earn any revenue and it only pays the cost of mounting the attack, uISP = −ε. Therefore,
it is better for ISP either to abstain, in which case its payoff would be uISP = 0, or to offer
cooperation, in which case its payoff would be uISP = c1 if AS accepts the cooperation. Thus,
in Case 1, cooperation is the best action for ISP . Whether ISP and AS cooperate now depends
on the action of AS. In Case 1, cooperation is also more profitable for AS (c2 > a), hence AS
accepts cooperation.
4. In practice, the cost ε might not be exactly the same in each stage of the game. However, the variations are insignificant
and since ε is negligible compared to the ad revenue, assuming a constant cost per stage does not influence the results.
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stage game and the corresponding total payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = 0
uAS = na (7)
As m ≥ Cssa holds in Case 2 as in Case 1, the best action for ISP is to offer cooperation, as
explained for Case 1. However, in Case 2 AS obtains a higher revenue when operating alone
than when cooperating with ISP (a ≥ c2), thus AS does not accept cooperation and the system
operates in the nominal mode in every stage game.
Result 3.1: In Case 3, if m < Cssna , there is a unique SPNE where the outcome is (Divert,Abstain)
in every stage game and the corresponding total payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = n(mb− ε)
uAS = n(1−m)a (8)
If ISP diverts such a small fraction m < Cssna of clicks as in Result 3.1, the loss of revenue it
imposes to AS is not significant enough to cause AS to secure the website, i.e., the cost of a
secure solution exceeds the loss of revenue. Therefore, ISP diverts a fraction m of clicks in all
stages and AS does not react.
Result 3.2: In Case 3, if Cssna ≤ m < Cssa , there are two SPNE that result in two different
outcomes. The first outcome is: (Divert,Abstain) in the first k1 stage games, where k1 = b εmb−εc
and 0 < k1 < n, (Divert,Secure) in the stage game k1 + 1 and (Abstain,Abstain) till the end. The
corresponding total payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = k1(mb− ε)− ε
uAS = k1(1−m)a+ a− Css + (n− k1 − 1)a (9)
The second outcome is (Abstain,Abstain) in the first k2 stage games, where k2 = dnma−Cssma e
and 0 < k2 < n, and (Divert,Abstain) in the last n − k2 stage games. The corresponding total
payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = (n− k2)(mb− ε)
uAS = k2a+ (n− k2)(1−m)a (10)
Result 3.2 means that if ISP wants to divert a high fraction of clicks, i.e., Cssna ≤ m < Cssa , it
cannot do so in all stages but only in a limited number of stages of the game. The two outcomes
show that ISP has two options to divert clicks. In the first outcome, ISP diverts clicks in the
first k1 stage games, which causes AS to secure the website in the stage game k1 +1 because the
loss of revenue for AS is higher than the cost of deploying the secure protocol. In the remaining
stages, ISP cannot divert clicks and there is no cooperation, as AS earns more when operating
alone (a ≥ c2), hence the system operates in the nominal mode. The second outcome means that
ISP has another possibility to divert clicks and avoid AS securing the website. If ISP abstains
in the first k2 stage games, it can then divert clicks in the remaining n− k2 stage games till the
end, with a fraction m < Css(n−k2)a . Intuitively, ISP can divert clicks in a larger number of stage
games but with a smaller fraction, or for a smaller number of stage games but with a larger fraction.
Result 4: In Case 4, there is a unique SPNE where the outcome is (Cooperate,Cooperate) in
every stage game and the corresponding total payoffs are given by (6).
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and c1 ≥ mb− ε), their best actions are to always cooperate.
Result 5.1: In Case 5, if m < (n−1)(a−c2)+Cssna , there is a unique SPNE where the outcome is
(Divert,Abstain) in every stage game and the corresponding total payoffs are given by (8).
The result shows that when ISP diverts a small fraction of clicks the loss of revenue for AS is
not significant enough to invest in securing the WS.
Result 5.2: In Case 5, if (n−1)(a−c2)+Cssna ≤ m < Cssa , there are two SPNE that result in two
different outcomes. The first outcome is: (Divert,Abstain) in the first k1 stage games, where k1 =
b ε+c1mb−ε−c1 c and 0 < k1 < n, (Divert,Secure) in the stage game k1 +1 and (Cooperate,Cooperate)
till the end. The corresponding total payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = k1(mb− ε)− ε+ (n− k1 − 1)c1
uAS = k1(1−m)a+ a− Css + (n− k1 − 1)c2 (11)
The second outcome is (Cooperate,Cooperate) in the first k2 stage games, where k2 = dn− Css−a+c2ma−a+c2 e
and 0 < k2 < n, and (Divert,Abstain) in the last n − k2 stage games. The corresponding total
payoffs, summed over n stages, are:
uISP = k2c1 + (n− k2)(mb− ε)
uAS = k2c2 + (n− k2)(1−m)a (12)
Result 5.2 shows that, as in Case 3, if ISP wants to divert a higher fraction of clicks it has
two possibilities: (i) divert in the first k1 stage games (the first outcome), or (ii) divert in the
last n− k2 stage games (the second outcome). The difference between the outcomes in Cases 3
and 5 is that when in Case 3 the system operates in the nominal mode, in Case 5 AS and ISP
cooperate. For ISP , cooperation is always better than operating in the nominal mode when it
earns nothing. However, AS benefits more when operating alone than when cooperating (a ≥ c2)
in Case 3, so it does not agree to cooperate. In Case 5 cooperation is more profitable (c2 > a),
hence AS agrees to cooperate.
The obtained outcomes of the multi-stage game for all the possible cases of parameters are
presented in Table 2. Each column corresponds to a SPNE of the multi-stage game and each row
corresponds to the achieved outcomes in each stage of the multi-stage game. Note that stages k1
and k2 are different in Case 3.2 and Case 5.2 and can be calculated with the expressions presented
in Result 3.2 and Result 5.2. For the simplicity of presentation we abstract this in Table 2 and
use the same symbols k1 and k2 for the both cases.
Table 2
OUTCOMES OF THE MULTI-STAGE GAME.
Stage of the multi-stage game Case 1 Case 2 Case 3.1 Case 3.2 Case 4 Case 5.1 Case 5.2
1 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (D,A) (A,A) (C,C) (D,A) (D,A) (C,C)
2 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (D,A) (A,A) (C,C) (D,A) (D,A) (C,C)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
k1 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (D,A) (A,A) (C,C) (D,A) (D,A) (C,C)
k1 + 1 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (D,S) (A,A) (C,C) (D,A) (D,S) (C,C)
k1 + 2 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (A,A) (A,A) (C,C) (D,A) (C,C) (C,C)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
k2 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (A,A) (A,A) (C,C) (D,A) (C,C) (C,C)
k2 + 1 (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (A,A) (D,A) (C,C) (D,A) (C,C) (D,A)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
n (C,C) (C,A) (D,A) (A,A) (D,A) (C,C) (D,A) (C,C) (D,A)
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6 Refinement of the Game-theoretic Model
In order to understand the implications of this game-theoretic model in reality, we will apply
the analysis of Section 5.3 to the real data set. Thus, we must first refine the game-theoretic model
by estimating the values of the parameters using the data that characterize an online advertising
system in practice. We consider three different modes of operation: (i) Nominal (Figure 3), (ii)
Non-cooperative (Figure 4) and (iii) Cooperative (Figure 5), that capture possible interactions
between entities of the system. The symbols used below are given in Table 3.
Table 3
TABLE OF SYMBOLS FOR THE NUMERICAL ANALYSIS.
Symbol Definition
K Set of Advertisers
K1 Set of Advertisers associated only with the Ad Server
K2 Set of Advertisers associated both with the Ad Server and the ISP
h Fraction of revenue paid by the Ad Server to websites
l Fraction of revenue paid by the Ad Server to ISP when cooperating
s Fraction of revenue paid by the ISP to a third party for providing targeted advertising
βj Fraction of clicks that become conversions
Q Volume of clicks
vk,j Advertiser k valuation of j’s clicks
6.1 Nominal Mode
The system operating in the nominal mode is depicted in Figure 3. It corresponds to the case
when ISP is faithfully forwarding the traffic and does not try to take part in the online advertising
system. A number of clicks, Q, is generated by users at the website WS. The clicks are registered
by AS that distributes them among associated AVs. We assume that AS distributes clicks uniformly
at random among the AVs. In practice, the volume of clicks given to each advertiser is typically
determined in an auction based on advertisers’ bids on given keywords. Modeling the auction
process would add complexity to the problem and is out of the scope of this paper, therefore we
assume that all advertisers receive the same amount of clicks. We also assume that there is no
click fraud, i.e., all the clicks from one ad network have the same conversion probability. Let the
conversion probability of a click from AS be β1.
AS WS UAVk vk,AS*Q/K Q
Q
h
Q/K
β1
Figure 3. Nominal Mode.
Advertiser AVk ∈ K, where K is the set of all AVs associated to AS and K = |K|, selects
its valuations vk,AS on clicks such that its revenue from AS is maximized. The valuations are
directly proportional to the conversion probability of the clicks (i.e., the quality of the clicks)
received from AS [18].
For the clicks that turn into conversions, AVs pay AS, and AS pays a fraction h of that amount
to the WS where the clicks were generated. We assume that AVs pay AS an amount of money
equal to their valuations of clicks (i.e., bids). Therefore, the nominal payoff of AS, a, is:
uAS =
Q
K
(1− h)
∑
k∈K
vk,AS = a (13)
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6.2 Non-cooperative Mode
If ISP chooses to become part of the online advertising system and to divert clicks from
AS, the system can be modeled as in Figure 4. ISP diverts a fraction m of Q clicks generated
at the website WS and distributes it uniformly at random among the set of its own associated
advertisers.
AS
WS U
AVk(1)
ISP
Q
(1-m)Q
mQ
h
(1-m)Q/K
mQ/K2
β1
β2  > β1
AVk(2)
(1-
m)Q
/K
mQ/K2*vk,ISP
v k,A
S*(
1-m
)Q
/K
vk,AS*(1-m)Q/K
Figure 4. Non-cooperative Mode.
In the non-cooperative model, we assume two types of AVs:
• Advertisers of type 1, AV (1), are associated only with AS because they care about their
reputation and they do not associate with ISP even if it would increase their revenues. The
set of AV (1) is represented by K1, where K1 = |K1|.
• Advertisers of type 2, AV (2), are associated with both ISP and AS. AV (2) are willing to
associate with ISP , because working with both AS and ISP generates more revenue. The
set of AV (2) is represented by K2, where K2 = |K2|.
There are no advertisers associated only with ISP , because advertisers that do not care about
their reputation have higher revenue when associated with both ISP and AS than in the case
when they are associated only with ISP . Therefore, we have K = K1 ∪ K2 and K1 +K2 = K.
An advertiser AV (2)k , associated with both AS and ISP , selects its valuations vk,AS and vk,ISP
on clicks such that its revenues from AS and ISP are maximized.
The conversion probability of clicks coming from ISP (β2) is higher than the conversion
probability of clicks coming from AS (β1), i.e., β2 > β1, due to better ad targeting based on
users’ private information. Therefore, an advertiser places higher valuations on clicks from ISP
than on clicks from AS, i.e., vk,ISP > vk,AS . The difference in valuations on clicks from two
different ad networks can be expressed as [18]:
vk,ISP =
β2
β1
vk,AS (14)
Given that ISPs do not necessarily have the resources to perform ad targeting themselves, we
assume that they rely on a third party entity, as observed in practice [11]. The partnering entity
provides ad targeting technology and in return, ISP gives the partner a fraction s of its revenue.
The payoffs of AS and ISP in the non-cooperative model are:
uAS =
(1−m)Q
K
(1− h)
∑
k∈K
vk,AS = (1−m)a (15)
uISP =
mQ
K2
(1− s)(
∑
k∈K2
vk,ISP )− ε = mb− ε (16)
where
b =
Q
K2
(1− s)
∑
k∈K2
vk,ISP (17)
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6.3 Cooperative Mode
When cooperating with AS (Figure 5), ISP provides users’ private information P that AS
uses to improve ad targeting, i.e., to improve the conversion probability of a click. The benefit
for AVs is that they receive clicks that have higher probability of conversion (β2) which is why
they offer higher valuations (vk,ISP ) for those clicks. Thus AS earns more money for Q clicks
when cooperating than when operating alone. In return for users’ private information, AS gives
a fraction l of the revenue to ISP .
AS WS UAVk
ISP
Q
Q
h
Q/K
β2  > β1
P l
vk,ISP*Q/K
Figure 5. Cooperative Mode.
In the cooperative model, based on (13) and (14), the payoffs of AS and ISP are:
uAS =
Q
K
(1− h− l)
∑
k∈K
vk,ISP =
β2
β1
1− h− l
1− h a = c2 (18)
uISP =
Q
K
l
∑
k∈K
vk,ISP =
β2
β1
l
1− ha = c1 (19)
Cooperation is good for AS when l ≤ (1−h)(1− β1β2 ), i.e., when the cooperation revenue (c2)
is greater than the nominal revenue (a), based on (18).
7 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the results in Section 5.3 on the Web using the above
equations and a real data set. We extend the analysis to multiple websites. Note that the outcome
of the game can be different for different websites, e.g., AS can decide to secure only some of
the websites while cooperating with ISP for the others. We are interested in the outcomes of the
game for the most popular 1000 websites.
7.1 Evaluations on a Real Data Set
The exact values of parameters that characterize the system in practice are difficult for us to
obtain. Many of them are kept confidential (e.g., Q and h) and some are difficult to quantify (e.g.,
the value of users’ private information). However, this information is available to the participating
entities of the game, namely ad networks and ISPs, thus our model is applicable in practice.
We use the following representative values of system parameters in our evaluations: (i) AS
pays h = 10% of the revenue to its referrers per click conversion [27]; (ii) ISP gives s = 30%
of the revenue to a third party ad targeting company (varying the values of s has no significant
effect on the results); (iii) the cost of each certificate is $399 [28]; (iv) the cost of mounting an
attack is ε ≤ $100 (writing and deploying scripts to perform on-the-fly modifications of the ad
traffic have a negligible cost, especially compared to the ad revenue and hence, the value of ε has
no effect on the results in practice) and (v) advertisers pay $0.5 per click conversion [29].
We infer the generated volume of clicks on ads on the 1000 most popular websites on the
Web, based on the data of page views on each website in June 2009 (Figure 6), obtained from
Compete.com. Based on the measurements reported in [30], 58% of the top websites host ads
and there are 8 ads per page on average. The probability that a click occurs on an ad is around
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Figure 6. Popularity of the top 1000 websites based on page views per month.
0.1% [31]. Consequently, to convert the number of page views into the number of clicks on ads
on each website, we use the following formula: Qi=(Page views on the website i)∗0.58∗8∗0.001.
There are two system parameters that influence the outcomes of the game: the fraction of shared
revenue when cooperating (l) and the improvement of ad targeting (β2β1 ). Thus, we take into account
different values of the two parameters and analyze their effects. The fraction m of clicks diverted
by non-cooperative ISP is also kept as a parameter of the analysis. We vary this parameter, and
then consider the equilibrium outcome for each of the 1000 most popular websites, as predicted by
the analysis in Section 5.3. Our numerical results show that the outcomes are mostly determined
by the values of the three parameters: l, β2β1 and m. By varying values of other system parameters
we conclude that they only insignificantly change the absolute values of the results but not the
main observations.
7.2 Numerical Results
In the case of a non-cooperative ISP , the outcomes of the multi-stage game for the 1000 most
popular websites are depicted in Figure 7(a). To obtain the non-cooperative scenario, we consider
that the fraction of shared revenue when cooperating is high (l = 0.4) and ad targeting is not
significantly improved (β2β1 = 1.75). The AS is not willing to cooperate and pay such a high price
for not so valuable user profiles, thus we observe the non-cooperative behavior. Outcomes are
represented with the four curves in Figure 7(a). Each curve represents a fraction of websites for
which the outcome of the game is the same.5
All the values of the Cooperate curve are equal to zero, which shows that, in this scenario,
cooperation will not be established in any stage of the multi-stage game, for any of the websites.6
The Divert curve represents the fraction of websites from which ISP successfully diverts a
fraction m of clicks during all stages of the multi-stage game.7 The Secure curve represents the
fraction of websites that AS will secure at some stage of the multi-stage game, due to ISP
diverting clicks.8 The fraction of websites for which ISP will abstain during all stages of the
multi-stage game is represented with the Abstain curve.9
Results show that ISP can divert a small fraction (m < 0.001%) of clicks from all of the 1000
websites (Divert curve equal to one) without causing AS to react (Secure curve equal to zero).
This amount of click diversion could be done in practice either by a very small ISP modifying
all the traffic of its subscribers or by a large ISP selectively modifying only a tiny portion of the
traffic it forwards.
5. For a given m, the sum of the values of the four curves is always equal to one.
6. The SPNE that correspond to Result 1, Result 4 and Result 5.2 are not achieved in the non-cooperative scenario.
7. The SPNE that correspond to Result 3.1 and Result 5.1.
8. The SPNE that corresponds to Result 3.2.
9. The SPNE that corresponds to Result 2.
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Figure 7. Outcomes of the game in the non-cooperative scenario applied to real data.
If ISP starts diverting a higher fraction of clicks, it causes AS to deploy security and protect the
concerned websites. Thus, we observe that the fraction of websites that will be secured among the
top 1000 websites (Secure curve) is increasing for higher values of m. Consequently, the fraction
of websites from which ISP successfully diverts clicks (Divert curve) is decreasing. When ISP
diverts m = 0.14% of clicks, almost all (98.7%) of the 1000 websites should be secured.
If ISP is to divert a higher fraction (m > 0.14%) of clicks, it would try do so only for the
websites for which the condition ma < Css holds, i.e., for which the revenue that ISP would
divert from AS is smaller than AS’s cost of deploying the security mechanism. Otherwise, AS
would secure the websites in the first stage of the game, which would cause ISP to only pay
the cost of mounting the attack without any gain. Thus, if the condition ma < Css does not
hold for a given website, ISP abstains during all stages of the multi-stage game. The fraction
of such websites for which ISP abstains during all stages of the multi-stage game is higher for
higher values of m, as represented with the increase of the Abstain curve following the increase
of m. This implies that the fraction of websites from which ISP will try to divert clicks becomes
smaller, thus resulting in fewer websites that need to be secured by AS (corresponding decreasing
values of the Secure curve). Further, results show that ISP will not try to divert a high fraction
(m > 14%) of clicks from any of the websites, but rather choose to abstain (Abstain curve equal
to one).
The Secure curve in Figure 7(a) only shows the fraction of websites that will be secured, but
we are also interested in which websites are those. The colored area in Figure 7(b) corresponds
to the popularity ranks of the websites that should be secured for a given value of m. Intuitively,
since the ISP diverts the same fraction m of clicks from all the websites and more popular
websites generate higher ad revenue, the loss of ad revenue for AS is higher for more popular
websites. As the cost of securing a website is the same for all the websites, it is better for AS
to first secure the most popular websites (i.e., those that generate highest ad revenue) among the
ones ISP tries to divert clicks from. In this way, AS protects more ad revenue at the same cost.
Based on the results in Figure 7(a), for small values of m (m ≤ 0.14%) ISP tries to divert
clicks from all of the websites and the fraction of websites to be secured increases with the increase
of m. The colored area in Figure 7(b) shows that for m ≤ 0.14% AS secures the fraction of
websites starting from the most popular ones, i.e., the highest ranked websites according to their
popularity.
However, as m increases (m > 0.14%) ISP will stop trying to divert clicks from the most
popular websites. We concluded earlier that ISP will not try to divert a given fraction m of
clicks from websites for which the condition ma < Css does not hold, as it would obtain a
negative payoff. For a given m, this becomes true first for the most popular websites that generate
high ad revenue a. Therefore, ISP would only try to divert clicks from the less popular websites.
Consequently, the threat exists only for the less popular websites and the most popular among those
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are the ones that will be secured by AS. For example, for m = 5%, 60% of the websites will be
secured by AS (Secure curve equal to 0.6 in Figure 7(a)) that correspond to websites ranked from
400 to 1000 (Figure 7(b)). For the highest ranked 40% there is no need to implement security
as ISP would abstain from diverting clicks from those, knowing that AS would immediately
implement security as ma > Css.
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Figure 8. Effects of the parameters l and β2
β1
on the game outcomes.
Next, we analyze the effect of the parameters l and β2β1 on the results. Figures 8(a) and 8(b)
represent the Secure curve for different values of parameters l and β2β1 , respectively. The graphs
show that non-cooperative behavior occurs when ISP demands a high share (0.4 ≤ l ≤ (1− h))
for the users’ profiles and when ad targeting cannot be significantly improved (β2β1 < 2). Observe
that the fraction of the websites to be secured follows the same pattern as in Figure 7(a). Thus,
following our analysis of the non-cooperative behavior, the threat of ISP diverting ad revenue
can lead to improved Web security. In our example, if ISP modifies around 0.14% of the clicks,
almost all of the websites should be secured.
The graphs in Figures 8(c) and 8(d) represent the fraction of the 1000 most popular websites
for which ISP and AS cooperate during all stages of the multi-stage game.10 The results show
that if AS does not have to give a high share of its revenue to ISP (0 < l < (1 − h)(1 − β1β2 ))
or if the users’ private information can significantly improve ad targeting (β2β1 ≥ 2), ISP and AS
cooperate for all of the websites.
We do not show the equilibrium outcomes Abstain and Divert, as they also follow the patterns
in Figure 7(a).
10. The SPNE that correspond to Result 1 and Result 4.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the recent problem of ISPs becoming strategic participants
in the online advertising business. We have proposed a game-theoretic model of this problem to
study the behavior and interactions of the ISPs and ad networks. We have applied our model
to the real data of the 1000 most popular websites to understand the meaning of the results in
practice. Our analysis shows that whether an ISP will be non-cooperative or cooperative mostly
depends on the value of the users’ private information obtained by ISPs and on their share of the
advertising revenue. The effect on the Web is positive in both cases: When ISPs are cooperative,
users receive better targeted ads and both ISPs and ad networks earn higher revenues; when ISPs
are non-cooperative, Web security can be improved as a side effect of protecting the ad revenue.
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Appendix A.
Proofs
We use induction to prove that the payoff expressions in Section 5.3 hold for any n ≥ 1. Next,
we apply backward induction to these payoffs to solve the multi-stage game of n stages. The
backward induction algorithm constructs a SPNE in finite games of perfect information [26]. We
only present proofs of the results for Case 3 as they are more complex. Results for Case 5 can
be proven in the same way as for the Case 3. Proofs for Cases 1, 2 and 4 are trivial.
Applying backward induction to the single stage game (Figure 2(a)) in Case 3 results in a
unique SPNE with the strategy (D,AAA). The corresponding total payoffs in the game outcome,
(Divert,Abstain), are: ((mb− ε), (1−m)a).
To prove the payoff expressions for the n stage game, we prove that they hold for 1 stage, we
assume they are true for j stages and prove that they hold for j+1 stages. We assume the relevant
subgames (denoted by SG) and the respective payoffs in the multi-stage game with j stages:
• SG1 : (j(mb − ε), j(1 −m)a), which corresponds to ISP successfully diverting clicks in
all stage games;
• SG2 : (k1(mb−ε)−ε, k1(1−m)a+a−Css+(j−k1−1)a) = (k1(mb−ε)−ε, (j−k1m)a−
Css), 0 < k1 < j, which corresponds to ISP successfully diverting clicks in the first k1
stage games, resulting in AS implementing security in the stage game k1 + 1, followed by
the system operating as in the nominal mode till the end;
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• SG3 : ((j−k2)(mb−ε), k2a+(j−k2)(1−m)a) = ((j−k2)(mb−ε), (k2m+ j(1−m))a),
0 < k2 < j, which corresponds to the system operating as in the nominal mode in the first
k2 stage games, followed by ISP diverting clicks till the end.
If we set j = 1 in SG1 (SG2 and SG3 do not exist in this case), we obtain the outcome
of a single stage game. Now let us extend the j stage game with an additional stage game and
solve the multi-stage game of j + 1 stage games. For all subgames where the security was not
implemented, in the unique SPNE in the j + 1st stage game the outcome is (Divert,Abstain).
Therefore, we add the payoffs (∆uISP ,∆uAS) = (mb− ε, (1−m)a) to the payoffs of ISP and
AS obtained after j stage games. In the subgames where security has been implemented, in the
unique SPNE in the j + 1st stage game the outcome is (Abstain,Abstain). We add the payoffs
(∆uISP ,∆uAS) = (0, a) to the payoffs of ISP and AS obtained after j stage games.
The obtained payoffs after j + 1 stage games are:
• SG1 : (j(mb− ε) + (mb− ε), j(1−m)a+ (1−m)a) = ((j+ 1)(mb− ε), (j+ 1)(1−m)a);
• SG2 : (k1(mb− ε)− ε+ 0, k1(1−m)a+ a− Css + (j − k1 − 1)a+ a) = (k1(mb− ε)−
ε, (j + 1− k1m)a− Css), 0 < k1 < j + 1;
• SG3 : ((j − k2)(mb − ε) + (mb − ε), k2a + (j − k2)(1 −m)a + (1 −m)a) = ((j + 1 −
k2)(mb− ε), (k2m+ (j + 1)(1−m))a), 0 < k2 < j + 1.
Observe that the payoffs of the game with j + 1 stages can be obtained by replacing j with
j + 1 in the payoffs of the game with j stages. As this also holds for j = 1, these payoffs hold
for any j by induction.
Now we can solve the game with n stages. Applying backward induction to this game, we
obtain three SPNE:
• For m < Css(n−k1)a , there is a unique SPNE that corresponds to the outcome of the SG1,
where ISP always diverts clicks. The SPNE strategy set is (D,AAA) in every stage game.
• For Css(n−k1)a < m <
Css
a , there are two SPNE. In the first SPNE, that corresponds to SG2,
ISP diverts clicks for k1 stage games, where k1 > (n− k2) + εmb−ε and 0 < k1 < n, AS
secures the website in k1 + 1st stage game and the system operates as in the nominal mode
till the end. The SPNE strategy set in the first k1 stage games is (D,AAA), in the stage game
k1 + 1 the strategy set is (D,SAA), and in every stage game till the end the strategy set
is (A,AAA). In the second SPNE, that corresponds to the outcome of the SG3, the system
operates as in the nominal mode for the first k2 stage games, where k2 = dnma−Cssma e and
0 < k2 < n, followed by ISP diverting clicks till the end. The SPNE strategy set in the
first k2 stage games is (A,SAA) and (D,AAA) in the last n− k2 stage games.
To obtain the results in Section 5.3, we chose the values of k1 and k2 as follows. In SG1 and
SG3, AS does not implement security, therefore k1 = 0. In SG2, as ISP does not divert clicks
after AS implements the secure solution, we need to set k2 = n. In SG3, the choice of k2 is
determined by the threat of AS implementing security. In a given stage game, AS compares the
cost of securing a website:
(n− k1)a− Css (20)
to the loss in revenue from diverted clicks:
k2a+ (n− k2)(1−m)a (21)
For m < Css(n−k2)a the loss of revenue is smaller than the cost of securing a website and AS
lets ISP divert a fraction of clicks in every stage game from k2 till n.
